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Introduction
Determinacy is a longstanding issue in Rational Expectations (RE) models with forward-looking terms (the …rst to focus on it were Gourieroux et al., 1982) . These terms enable a 'non-fundamental'or 'bubble' solution to be found besides the usual one only containing fundamentals. The usual practice to ignore these alternative solutions. For example, in the New Keynesian Taylor Rule (NK) model of in ‡ation determination (which have been the centerpiece of monetary analysis over the past two decades), King (2000) and Woodford (2003) claim bubble paths are somehow impossible. 1 However, there needs to be a good reason to ignore these alternative solutions. As Cochrane (2011) has argued this is insu¢ cient: a) these paths are 'possible'(nothing would stop them if they happened) but b) they are also incredible since they involve hyperin ‡ation/hyperde ‡ation ('the Fed blowing up the world').
How much does all this matter? Models without determinacy (the absence of a unique RE solution) such as the popular NK model, are problematic as they stand and so do not rate as models of interest.
They do not provide a unique prediction about how the model economy-and thus the actual economy being modeled-behaves. So there must be some mechanism that ensures determinacy (the Taylor Principle does not do it as argued by Cochrane, 2011) .Consequently, a number of additional requirements have been proposed by various researchers in order to obtain a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE). 2 McCallum (2011) agrees with Cochrane's analytical point on the non-uniqueness of REE but goes on to defend the NK model: the bubble paths are 'not learnable'and learnability is a condition for a model to be well-founded. His thesis is that the bubble solution does not converge on the RE solution i.e., the bubble path is 'not learnable'. However, the stable solution is learnable: hence the NK model, when it is learnt, will have a unique stable solution. But it is hard to know what meaning to attach to the idea of a 'solution'(purely) being learnt.
In general in the learning literature the related question asked is whether agents when learning will converge on the rational expectations solution and so learn the RE model, so that henceforth it can operate as an RE model. Thus the convergence is to the RE model. So does McCallum mean by 'solutions are learnt'a) that people then know the model and it acts like a rational expectations model, having thus been learnt? or does he mean b) that people know the model and it is a rational expectations 1 The NK approach to monetary economics provides the current standard model of in ‡ation determination. By linking interest rate decisions directly to in ‡ation and economic activity, the Taylor Rule o¤ers a convenient tool for studying monetary policy while abstracting from a detailed analysis of the demand and supply of money. This change in the standard analytics is an understandable re ‡ection of how most central banks now make monetary policy: by setting a short-term nominal interest rate, with little if any explicit role for money (see Friedman, 2003) . Furthermore, econometric evidence supporting the stabilization properties of this rule (see Taylor, 1999 ) and its usefulness for understanding historical monetary policy (see Clarida et al., 2000) explains its popularity. 2 These include a transversality condition on money supply behaviour that would rule out this explosive solution for the in ‡ation rate (Minford and Srinivasan, 2011a, b) and non-Ricardian …scal policy (Cochrane, 2011). model, but these people are only aware of one solution i.e., the stable one? If a) then as we know they will know the general solution of an NK model which includes the bubble solution. If b) then they have not learnt the model since they will be unaware of the general solution that it implies! In this case, after 'learning', we would have some model with an autoregressive expectations process, and not the NK RE model which is supposed to be 'supported'by learnability. Thus the only intelligible statement that McCallum could be making seems to be a). But a) implies that if and when it is learnt the NK model has a bubble solution to be found besides the usual one only containing fundamentals.
In sum we can all agree: NK models have serious problems and are not 'proper models'. Also they are proper models if the indeterminacy is somehow removed. But this does not tell us what mechanism inside the model can remove indeterminacy: note learnability is not a mechanism inside the model. It is a desirable …nal attribute of a good model. Once the model has been learnt, it is impossible to stop agents from knowing the true RE model and discovering the general solution with bubbles. McCallum's analysis gives us no remedy for this. Unfortunately it is still a model with a non-uniqueness problem.
Hence we agree with Cochrane that imposing 'desirable attributes' on the model does not answer the root theoretical question: how can we modify this model internally to make it determinate?
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study determinacy in the standard three-equation NK model. We explain how researchers deal with multiple equilibria in these models. In Section 3 we review the concept of E-stability, explain how this criterion is alleged to select the economically relevant RE solution in cases in which multiple equilibria obtain, and we show that it fails to do so. In Section 4 we argue that a terminal condition on monetary behaviour justi…ed by welfare can modify the NK model internally to make it determinate. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. (2003)). For determinacy questions, we can work with a stripped-down model without constants or shocks.
where t = in ‡ation, z t = the output gap and r t = the nominal interest rate. This representation can represent deviations from a speci…c equilibrium of a model with shocks (see Cochrane, 2011) . The …rst equation is the NK Phillips curve (NKPC). It is derived from the …rst order conditions of intertemporally-optimizing …rms that set prices subject to costs. 3 The second equation is a log-linear approximation to an Euler equation for the timing of aggregate expenditure, sometimes called an "intertemporal IS relation". This is the one that indicates how monetary policy a¤ects aggregate expenditure: the expected shortterm real rate of return determines the incentive for intertemporal substitution between expenditure in periods t and t +1.
As it stands this is a 2 equation, 3 unknown ( t , z t , r t ) model. The remaining equation required to close the system is a speci…cation of monetary policy. We might, for example, close the model by assuming r t = r, a constant. Substituting for r t = r in (2.2), the model (2.1-2.2) can be written in the form, 2
The stability/instability of the equilibrium is predicted solely on the make up of the said Jacobian -J E .
Determinacy of the equilibrium requires that we have just enough stable roots as there are predetermined variables.
Proposition 1 If the number of eigenvalues of J E outside the unit circle is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables (or forward-looking variables), then there exists a unique stable solution.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
Proposition 2 Let 1 , 2 lie in the complex plane, then: the i 's (i = 1, 2) are both outside the unit circle if and only if the following conditions are satis…ed:
In the NK model set out above both t and z t are non-predetermined. Therefore, we need both of the eigenvalues of J E :
to lie outside the unit circle. The eigenvalues of J E that is, 1 and 2 , are computed by setting det (J E I) = 0. This gives a second-order polynomial in :
where T r (J E ) = ( + + ) = ( ) and Det (J E ) = 1= . For the usual parameter values in NK models
Proposition 3 If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is less than the number of nonpredetermined variables, there is an in…nity of stable solutions. Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
The system does not provide a unique solution for t and z t . For a …xed nominal interest rate (r t = r), the model economy will feature in…nitely many non-explosive ouput and in ‡ation paths -the 'non-uniqueness'problem (Taylor, 1977) . That is, one could choose any value for t di¤erent from ? , and the solution describes a path that eventually takes the system back to steady state (i.e., t ! ? , as t ! 1). Because there is an uncountable number of such paths, each of which follows a path back to steady state, it follows that there is a multiplicity of stable equilibria. In principle any of these stable paths could be selected. The model does not restrict our choice. 
The Taylor Principle and Determinacy of the Equilibrium
As before the eigenvalues of J E that is, 1 and 2 , are computed by setting det (J E I) = 0. This gives a second-order polynomial in : is because in this model the monetary authority is absolutely committed to raising interest rates more than one for one with in ‡ation, for all values of in ‡ation. For only one value of in ‡ation today will we fail to see in ‡ation that explodes. NK modellers thus conclude that in ‡ation today jumps to this unique value.
But how do they rule out the explosive equilibria? Here NK authors become vague, saying that such paths would be 'inconceivable'and hence 'ruled out by private agents'. 6 The problem as pointed out by Minford and Srinivasan (2011a, b) is twofold: …rst, that these threats are not credible. The reason is that, once in ‡ation or de ‡ation happens, carrying through on the threat is a disastrous policy. As a result self-destructive threats are less likely to be carried out ex-post, and thus less likely to be believed ex-ante.
The second problem with these threats is that even if they were credible and did actually happen, there seems to be nothing to stop people following the implied paths. Clearly they will prefer the stable path;
but how can they be sure it will happen, given that all the paths are feasible.While undesirable from a social viewpoint, they do not appear to be impossible. Hence there is nothing to make them infeasible.
McCallum (2009a, 2011) agrees about the existence of this problem and proposes to rule these paths out by the 'learnability criterion'to which we now turn.
3 Ruling out unstable equilibria in New-Keynesian models -the
Learnability Criterion
In this section we review the concept of E-stability (learnability) and explain how McCallum (2011) uses this criterion for "selection" of the economically relevant RE solution in cases in which the unstable (or bubble) path obtains. Recall the NK model we developed earlier:
where following Bullard and Mitra (2002) we have replaced i t with r t r n t , where r t is the nominal interest rate and r n t is the natural rate of interest, assumed to obey:
As this model has two equations but three unknowns ( t , z t , r t ), we need a further equation for the nominal interest rate to close the model. As before consider a contemporaneous version of the Taylor rule : 7
Substituting (3.3) into the expectations IS equation and using the NKPC we can write the system as:
where the form of is omitted since it is not needed in what follows. Since both t and z t in the system are free, we need both of the eigenvalues of B to be inside the unit circle for determinacy. As we 7 Bullard and Mitra (2002) have already seen this is satis…ed for the model in question provided, > 1. 8 But how does the Fed plan to stabilise in ‡ation in this model? As we have seen E t z t+i and E t t+i explode in any equilibrium other than z = 0, = 0. How to rule out such explosive equilibria?
E-Stability and Learnability
Let us recast agents in our model as econometricians and ask whether, if endowed with the correct reduced form model for x t , these agents could learn the parameterization of this model ( , , , , ) which we assume is unknown to them. That is, we assume that agents have the correct perceived law of motion (PLM) and posit that by running regressions each period, as new data becomes available, they might learn the model parameters, i.e. they would learn to have rational expectations. So the central question is: if agents estimate a statistical model which is a correct speci…cation of an REE, under what circumstances will the estimates converge to that REE?
We now de…ne precisely the concept of E-stability. For the study of learning, we endow agents in our model with a PLM of the form, Condition (3.9) is satis…ed provided, > 1. Recall that the Taylor principle was also a necessary condition for determinacy of the REE. It turns out that the condition that ensures that the MSV solution is E-stable (learnable) is identical to the condition that guarantees uniqueness of REE, i.e., the Taylor principle.
The Learnability Criterion for selection of the economically relevant RE solution
McCallum in a series of articles (2003, 2004, 2007, 2009a, b, 2011) (2011). This model has the advantage of transparency and so the least risk of confusion for the general argument. 9 In this model our semi-reduced form solution is
where the monetary policy error, e t = e t 1 + " t with " t being white noise and with j j < 1), and 1 > 0 is the Taylor principle.
This model has a bubble-free or MSV solution (1) t = 1 1+ 1 e t . It also has a bubble solution (2) t = 1 1+ 1 e t + B t where B t is a sunspot which is expected to explode at the rate (1 + 1 ), so that E t t+1 = 1+ 1 e t +(1+ 1 )B t ; or equivalently t = 1 e t +(1+ 1 ) t 1 . Notice that the general solution of the model is (2) . That is to say, (2) expresses in one expression 'what the model implies'about the path(s) of in ‡ation, the endogenous variable. (1) is only a solution if B t is ignored: but according to the model it cannot be. McCallum's point is that, while solution (1) above is E-stable, solution (2) is not.
He goes on to say that as a consequence, solution (2) cannot occur in practice (because if a solution cannot be learnt, then it has no way of coming into being)-and thus that solution (1) is in fact the only outcome that can be predicted by the model.
To see this point it is convenient to express our model in the form (3.4) above. Thus we have,
We can combine these two relations to yield
Then if the shock term (vt) is neglected and 0 = b 0 =b 1 is recognized as a constant real rate of interest, we get the semi-reduced form used in the text.
where B = 1=1 + 1 and = (1=1 + 1 ). Is the bubble solution learnable? Suppose we endow agents in our model with a PLM of the form,
which does not correspond to the MSV or fundamental solution (solution (1) above). Recall that agents assume that data is being generated by the process t = ae t + c t 1 , but that they do not know the parameters a and c. At time t they have estimates (a t , c t ) which they use to make their forecasts, so that E t t+1 is given by
Substituting the learning agent's forecast into equation to have real parts less than one for E-stability which is satis…ed provided, 1 > 0. any of the solution expressions that are not bubble-free, they will not converge on the NK RE model.
What is the intuition behind this result? The reason the PLM for the 'unique stable'solution is learnable is because, as a 'backward looking solution'it is stable in the usual way (all eigenvalues inside the unit circle), whereas the 'unstable'PLM (for the rogue solutions) is simply unstable backwards and so presumably cannot be learnt because it ‡uctuates wildly, forming no patterns in the data that converge on a unique steady equilibrium path. Thus agents would give up on the unstable formula, realising they were not learning. We can see no reason in broad terms to question this conclusion.
One could add that these models are also not testable (at least in any normal way 4 What mechanism inside the model can remove indeterminacy in NK models?
Here we refer to two papers we recently wrote (Minford and Srinivasan, 2011a, b) which McCallum (2011) cites: these argue that we can rule out bubbles by providing an internal mechanism to the model.
Our idea is similar to that of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) , and see Cochrane (2011) for a comprehensive survey of other somewhat similar approaches. Also one can see in a loose way that the ECB's second (money) pillar could be interpreted as a mechanism of this sort.
The idea is to use transversality conditions for nominal variables analogous to those for real variables;
we posit a money demand and money supply function. The latter mimics the Taylor Rule in 'normal times'(i.e., money is supplied to meet the Taylor Rule interest rate setting). However, if a bubble path for in ‡ation were to occur then the money supply would revert to a '…xed-in ‡ation' rule-similar to a '…xed exchange rate'rule-in which money supply would be whatever was needed to enforce the constancy of in ‡ation. This terminal condition acts to terminate any bubble prospectively: hence no bubble path can occur and the normal Taylor Rule is always observed.
This also deals with indeterminacy when there is no unique stable path, the 'non-uniqueness'probleman example is the Taylor Rule before the 1980s according to Clarida et al. (2000) when they argue the Taylor principle did not hold ( < 1). The terminal condition also disables these bubble paths (though here these are implosive or stable, the variance of in ‡ation is still unbounded).
Conclusion
Models without determinacy are problematic as they stand and so do not rate as models of interest. On this we can all agree, including McCallum and Cochrane. So there must be some mechanism that ensures determinacy. McCallum says it is not needed because models are learnable only with the determinate solution and so the NK model, once learnt in this way, will be determinate. We agree: the only learnable solution that has agents converge on the true NK model is the bubble-free one. But once they have converged they must then understand the model and its full solution therefore including the bubble.
Hence the learnability condition still fails to select the determinate solution. So the problem remains.
Terminal conditions on monetary behaviour justi…ed by welfare can provide the mechanism, converting NK models into proper NK models that can be used by economists in the usual way.
